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LEADS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN "DEATH OF STALIN" PLANS FROM:

Service Conditions and Morale in the Soviet Army - Volume I (I)

Service Conditions and Morale in the Soviet Air Force - Volume II (II)

Interviews with Former Soviet Citizens (III)

(These hereafter referred to as I, II, III.)

1. On Influencing Red Army

I-Page 365 - Statistics of 88 Soviet Army defectors provide the following pertinent info---which should be evaluated with the reservation that "defectors" are probably not "average" soldiers.

Two-thirds were under 30-33% born from 1926 to 1930, 30% born 1921 to 1925

Largest percentage (36%) were of peasant origin; next came urban skilled workers with 10%

73% were single (but Russian enlisted men are not permitted to marry)

80% had first-degree kin in Russia

Almost 90% had some contact with West prior to defection

65% had some religious belief; 35% did not

Education was above average

The "power of women" was evident; 33 defections were influenced by German women compared to 47 which were not

About half "experienced personal sense of threat prior to defection" and 23 (about one quarter) had disciplinary proceedings pending

I-Page 7 - Political "regularity" is a requirement for most membership in Border Guard, Air Force, tank and other technical units--indicating Approved For Release 2003/12/16: CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020019-1

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that enlisted infantry would be most susceptible units for approach

I-Page 244 - "The (infantry) has poor rations...it gets the poorest quality personnel from the point of view of education or special skill."

wise

I-Page 267 - It is not preside to appeal too strongly to Soviet soldiers by offer of physical or material comforts as these are construed as weaknesses. Deprivation proves manliness of soldier. They don't fear death or injury. They can take most anything.

I-Page 35 - Corollary to above, since Russian military hates "softies" any such traits in Stalin's successors could be exploited.

I-Page 9 - Vodka is as important to the Soviet soldier as food; theoretically, in peacetime he gets none.

I-Page 14 - Soldiers regard Stalin as an able man, doing what he can for his country, but do not feel affection for him. Page 274 - He is held in awe.

I-Page 53 - Purges of Tukhachevsky and other Army personnel in 1937 and 8 might be exploit-able.

I-Page 126 - Soviet soldiers love to have their pictures taken. This could be a narcisstic trait, open to psychological warfare use.

I-Pages 13 and 40 - In appealing by words to minority groups in the military, dialect is important. Asiatic groups, Uzbeks and others, often hardly understand Russian language. This accounts for part of their susceptibility, at the same time complicates effective approach.

<u>I-Page 325</u> - There are said to be one MGB agent or informer to every 10 to 14 men in an infantry battalion and an even larger proportion in Air Force and other "higher" services. <u>I-Page 270</u> - Actions of MGB at time of death of Stalin will have to be carefully weighed in planning persuasion of military.

Approved For Release 2003/12/16: CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020019-1 (Zampoli and Party members are additional policing forces.)

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I-Pages 49 & 54 - In time of peace, being a soldier satisfies few of the needs and aspirations of a Russian man. <u>II-Page 84</u> - In time of war, his resentment would be overcome by patriotism. <u>I-Page 4</u> - He loves his native land, hates enemy who attacks it. Wants to be buried on Russian soil, not a foreign land.

I-Page 74 - The possibility of defection should not be over-estimated from the Vlasov surrender.

Outside-Russia appeals to the military considered practical in time of peace might, in the light of the above, become useless or nearly so in wartime.

2. Appeals to Russian Minorities

The majority of the military seems to be anti-Semitic (<u>I-Page 259</u>). Except for this, no deeply rooted ethnic animosity seems evident (<u>I-Page 261</u>). There is evidence that some ethnic groups feel discriminated against, whether they are or not (I-Page 264) but during the last war only a "very small proportion" of either Great Russians or minority nationalities "surrendered individually" (<u>I-Page 73</u>).

I-Pager 263 and 4 - Uzbeks and other Central Asians appear to be most discriminated against in the Soviet Army and therefore most likely targets for influence.

Ukrainians, North Caucasians and White Russians are second most likely. (Statements below are all taken from Volume III and are <u>Unevaluated Interviews</u> with Former Soviets. Each is therefore merely an individual opinion.)

- 1. "A Ukrainian Insurgent Army is still operating in the Soviet Ukraine." Page 215-III
- 2. "Not the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, not even the party except for the 'apparatus' back Stalin. He has only this Approved For Release 2003/12/16: CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020019-1

'apparatus' and the NKVD. A war would bring the collapse of everything." Page 225-III

- 3. "If there should be trouble in the country, the NKVD would run away or else collaborate with the new regime--if they could survive the hatred of the people." Page 225-III
- 4. "The Russian people put up with the Bolsheviks. Bad as they are, they are still Russian and that is always better than a foreign invader." Page 233
- 5. "There are underground groups in the Soviet Union, against the regime. They would fight the Bolsheviks and it is important for the Allies to have contact with them." (Page 233-III)

3. Appeals on Collectivist Issue

"Among the soldiers of peasant stock, there is a vague, innate sentimentality about some features of the old regime. Rumors began to spread that in the postwar period large-scale changes would take place and private landownership by the peasantry would be reintroduced."

I-Page 67

"The peasants are definite in their desire to own their own land again."

I-Page 68

The Russian's love of country is often "local", embracing particularly the land he once owned. "Russians frequently express their wish to die on native soil and be buried there." I-Page 70

4. <u>In General</u>

Paper clips (larger side of clips is the marker) point to passages which might be of some use in appealing to Soviet. Volumes II and III produced little; most quotable, useful data came from Volume I (Service Conditions

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